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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no incentive to keep it, while each buyer has a downward sloping demand curve which is private information. Only the connected buyer-seller pairs can engage in trade. We search for trade mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof, bilateral trade stable and individually rational. In general, there does not exist a trade mechanism simultaneously satisfying these properties. The tension between strat...
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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Kelly, David L.; Taylor, Curtis R.
摘要：We introduce a new market microstructure model to study a setting in which an authority (e.g. a firm manager or government policymaker) learns about the likelihood of a bad state by observing activity in the asset market, before deciding whether to undertake a costly intervention to improve the state. Intervention erodes the value of an investor's private information by weakening the link between the initial state and the asset payoff. Informed investors are reluctant to make large, informativ...
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作者：Kogan, Leonid; Ross, Stephen A.; Wang, Jiang; Westerfield, Mark M.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：The hypothesis that financial markets punish traders who make relatively inaccurate forecasts and eventually eliminate the effect of their beliefs on prices is of fundamental importance to the standard modeling paradigm in asset pricing. We establish straightforward necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to survive and to affect prices in the long run in a general setting with minimal restrictions on endowments, beliefs, or utility functions. We describe a new mechanism for the distinc...
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作者：Bowen, T. Renee; Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya; Zapal, Jan
作者单位：Stanford University; Johns Hopkins University; Rice University; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an ...
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作者：Hedlund, Jonas
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper introduces private sender information in a game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to characterize the set of equilibria selected by the D1 criterion. These equilibria are either separating (i.e., the sender's choice of signal reveals his private information to the receiver) or fully disclosing (i.e., the outcome of the sender's chosen signal fully reveals the payof...
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作者：Luo, Xiao; Qiao, Yongchuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：We show, by means of a counterexample, that Propositions 3, 4, and 7 in Gul (1996) [G96] are incorrect. Our example is also a counterexample to Lemma 1 in G96, which is the basis for the proofs of these propositions. We provide insight for the source of the problem in the definition of a perfect tau-theory in G96, and then offer a modification that restores these results in G96. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Diecidue, Enrico; Somasundaram, Jeeva
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：We present a new behavioral foundation for regret theory. The central axiom of this foundation trade-off consistency - renders regret theory observable at the individual level and makes our foundation consistent with a recently introduced empirical and quantitative measurement method. Our behavioral foundation allows deriving a continuous regret theory representation and separating utility from regret. The axioms in our behavioral foundation clarify that regret theory minimally deviates from e...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgy
作者单位：Duke University; Northwestern University
摘要：In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent's choice of action, and show that money-burning may be part of the optimal contract. This result holds even if...
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作者：Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Max Planck Society
摘要：McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full surplus extraction is generically possible. We interpret the McAfee Reny condition as a much stronger version of injectiveness of belief functions and prove genericity by arguments similar to those used to...
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作者：Maestri, Lucas
摘要：We study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely-repeated screening model with long-term contracts. We propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist's profit is maximized after every history. We show that the monopolist sequentially screens high-type consumers and characterize second-degree price discrimination policies. The monopolist's ability to extract rent from high-type consumers by distorting the allocation of low-type consumers v...
