Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laclau, Marie; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 400-424
• 关键词: Repeated games; Public monitoring; Pure strategies; approachability

摘要

We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a perfect equilibrium, as players become increasingly patient. There are two conditions: admissibility and joint rationality. An admissibly feasible payoff can be achieved by an action profile that offers no unilateral deviation which is both undetectable and profitable. It is jointly rational if for all weights on players, the weighted average payoff is greater than or equal to the minmax level of the weighted average payoff function. This characterization is alternative to the one provided by the score method of Fudenberg and Levine (1994). We provide a simple construction of equilibrium strategies based on cooperation, punishments and rewards. Punishments rely on Blackwell's approachability algorithm. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.