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作者：Breu, Mariana Rojas
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：This paper presents a framework in which fiat money has value in equilibrium even though a risk-free higher-return asset can be equally used as a medium of exchange. In a limited-commitment environment, agents may prefer to borrow a low-return asset because that results in a larger borrowing capacity. Thus, a monetary equilibrium in which money is dominated in rate of return exists. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Arribas, I.; Urbano, A.
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia
摘要：This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedule (mixed bundling prices), the paper shows that pure strategy efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. While inefficient equilibria may exist, this can be ruled out by refining the equilibrium correspondence using the co...
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作者：Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora
作者单位：Tilburg University; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper studies information release in symmetric, independent private value auctions with multiple objects and unit demand. We compare effects on welfare to those on the seller's revenue. Applying the dispersive order, the previous literature could only identify settings in which welfare provides the stronger incentives for information release. We generalize the dispersive order to k- and k-m-dispersion. These new criteria allow us to systematically characterize situations in which revenue ...
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作者：Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable breakdowns. When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium. Randomization leads to dispersion in actions and to belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. The resulting lack of coordination has significant welfare consequences. In contrast, when actions are observa...
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Schutz, Nicolas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Mannheim
摘要：Applied researchers often work with demand systems that do not depend on income, with the implicit assumption that preferences are quasi-linear and income sufficiently large. The classic approach to the integrability of demand does not readily apply in this case. Adopting a much simpler approach that is based on integrating the vector field defined by the demand system and on duality, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the quasi-linear integrability of such (continuous) demand ...
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作者：Samuelson, Larry; Stacchetti, Ennio
作者单位：Yale University; New York University
摘要：When are economic interactions mediated by prices and transfers, and when are they mediated by variations in the continuation payoffs within a relationship? To address this question, we examine a relationship between two players who periodically face opportunities to undertake randomly generated projects that impose a cost on one player and a benefit on the other, as well as opportunities to make voluntary transfers to one another. We characterize the set of equilibria, with particular emphasi...
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作者：Choi, Michael; Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：When is the weighted sum of quasi-concave functions quasi-concave? We answer this, extending an analogous preservation of the single-crossing property in QS: Quah and Strulovici (2012). Our approach develops a general preservation of n-crossing properties, applying the variation diminishing property in Karlin (1956). The QS premise is equivalent to Karlin's total positivity of order two, while our premise uses total positivity of order three: The weighted sum of quasi-concave functions is quas...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; De Castro, Luciano
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：This paper proposes a new general class of strategic games and develops an associated new existence result for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For a two-player game with scalar and compact action sets, existence entails that one reaction curve be increasing and continuous and the other quasi-increasing (i.e., not have any downward jumps). The latter property amounts to strategic quasi-complementarities. The paper provides a number of ancillary results of independent interest, including suffici...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple one-dimensional mechanisms, such as selling the goods separately, guarantee at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least 50% when they are independent. For the case of k > 2 independent goods, we show that selling them...
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作者：Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. Projects may differ in their value for the designer, and their cost is private information. In this allocation problem, the quantity of procured projects is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: the participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify settings i...
