On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.005
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 27-43
• 关键词: Matching with contracts; STABILITY; strategy-proofness; uniqueness; EFFICIENCY; Irrelevance of rejected contracts

摘要

This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand, we obtain the following results. First, the number of stable and strategy-proof rules is at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategy-proof rule, whenever it exists, is second-best optimal for doctor welfare, in that no individually rational and strategy-proof rule can dominate it. This last result is further generalized to non-wasteful and strategy-proof rules. Due to the weak assumptions, our analysis covers a broad range of markets, including cases where a (unique) stable and strategy-proof rule is not equal to the one induced by the cumulative offer process or the deferred acceptance algorithm. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.