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作者：Jewitt, Ian; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of preferences constructed to be (strictly) partially ordered by a more ambiguity averse relation. First, we define two notions of more ambiguous with respect to such a class. A more ambiguous (I) act makes an amb...
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作者：Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter A.; Wolthoff, Ronald P.
作者单位：Tongji University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Toronto
摘要：In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call joint concavity. Both outcomes can be decentralized by ...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; University of Warwick
摘要：We study the attitude of decision makers to skewed noise. For a binary lottery that yields the better outcome with probability p, we identify noise around p with a compound lottery that induces a distribution over the exact value of the probability and has an average value p. We propose and characterize a new notion of skewed distributions, and use a recursive non-expected utility to provide conditions under which rejection of symmetric noise implies rejection of negatively skewed noise, yet d...
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作者：Giannoni, Marc P.; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Columbia University
摘要：This paper considers a general class of nonlinear rational-expectations models in which policymakers seek to maximize an objective function that may be household expected utility. We show how to derive a target criterion that is: (i) consistent with the model's structural equations, (ii) strong enough to imply a unique equilibrium, and (iii) optimal, in the sense that a commitment to adjust the policy instrument at all dates so as to satisfy the target criterion maximizes the objective functio...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Hanyang University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper investigates the dynamic foundation of a competitive equilibrium, studying a sequence of random matching models between ex ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers under two-sided incomplete information with no entry, where each agent is endowed with non-transferable utility. The economy is populated with two sets of infinitesimal agents, buyers and sellers, who have private information about their own valuations of the object. In each period, buyers and sellers in the pool are matched...
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作者：Schlag, Karl H.; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Glasgow
摘要：We study decision making in complex discrete-time dynamic environments where Bayesian optimization is intractable. A decision maker is equipped with a finite set of benchmark strategies. She aims to perform similarly to or better than each of these benchmarks. Furthermore, she cannot commit to any decision rule, hence she must satisfy this goal at all times and after every history. We find such a rule for a sufficiently patient decision maker and show that it necessitates not to rely too much ...
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作者：Alexandrov, Alexei; Bedre-Defolie, Oezlem
作者单位：Amazon.com; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：The LeChatelier-Samuelson principle states that, as a reaction to a shock, an agent's short-run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long-run adjustment (when the agent can also adjust other related actions). We extend the principle to strategic environments where the long-run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies. We show that the principle holds for supermodular games (strategic complements) satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide s...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be strategically distinguished in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of interdependent preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution co...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We analyze a large roommate problem (i.e., marriage matching in which the marriage is not restricted solely to matchings between men and women) with non-transferable utility. It is well known that while a roommate problem may not have a stable proper matching, each roommate problem does have an stable improper matching. In a random utility model with types from Dagsvik (2000) and Menzel (2015), we show that all improper stable matchings are asymptotically close to being a proper stable matchin...
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作者：Parenti, Mathieu; Ushchev, Philip; Thisse, Jacques-Francois
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being flexible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. Even though preferences need not be additive and/or homothetic, the market outcome is still driven by the sole variable elasticity of substitution. We impose elementary conditions on this function to guarantee empirically relevant properties of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to market size and...
