Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casajus, Andre; Yokote, Koji
• 署名单位: HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Waseda University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 274-284
• 关键词: TU game; Shapley value; Differential marginality; Weak differential marginality

摘要

The principle of differential marginality for cooperative games states that the differential of two players' payoffs does not change when the differential of these players' marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them does not change. Together with two standard properties, efficiency and the null player property, differential marginality characterizes the Shapley value. For games that contain more than two players, we show that this characterization can be improved by using a substantially weaker property than differential marginality. Weak differential marginality requires two players' payoffs to change in the same direction when these players' marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them change by the same amount. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.