Stability with one-sided incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, Sushil
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 372-399
• 关键词: Stable matching; incomplete information; Incomplete-information core

摘要

Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties.(C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.