Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
• 署名单位: Aalto University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 629-640
• 关键词: All-pay auction; large auctions

摘要

This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.