Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 234-269
• 关键词: Experimentation; free-riding; Mixed strategies; monitoring; delay

摘要

We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable breakdowns. When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium. Randomization leads to dispersion in actions and to belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. The resulting lack of coordination has significant welfare consequences. In contrast, when actions are observable, the equilibrium is pure and welfare improves. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.