Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arribas, I.; Urbano, A.
• 署名单位: University of Valencia; University of Valencia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.004
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 14-38
• 关键词: Multiproduct price competition; Delegated agency games; Mixed bundling prices; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Strong equilibrium

摘要

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedule (mixed bundling prices), the paper shows that pure strategy efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. While inefficient equilibria may exist, this can be ruled out by refining the equilibrium correspondence using the concept of subgame perfect Strong equilibrium. In addition, the paper shows that each principal's set of equilibrium contracts of minimum cardinality may contain at least three offers. When the social surplus function is monotone and unit costs are constant, only two offers are required at the equilibrium outcome.(C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.