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作者：Honryo, Takakazu
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：This paper constructs a model of dynamic persuasion. A sender attempts to persuade a decision maker (DM) by sequentially revealing verifiable arguments, but this incurs communication costs. In equilibrium, the sender decides when to give up, and the DM decides when to make a decision. We characterize the DM-optimal equilibrium. We further show that the DM gains from making a stochastic commitment, and provide a condition under which it also makes the sender better-off. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Doval, Laura
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I study a single-agent sequential search problem as in Weitzman (1979). Contrary to Weitzman, conditional on stopping, the agent may take any uninspected box without first inspecting its contents. This introduces a new trade-off. By taking a box without inspection, the agent saves on its inspection costs. However, by inspecting it, he may discover that its contents are lower than he anticipated. I identify sufficient conditions on the parameters of the environment under which I characterize th...
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作者：Li, Shengwu; Yu, Ning Neil
作者单位：Harvard University; Nanjing Audit University; Stanford University
摘要：An agent makes consumption choices in multiple periods. Choice objects vary in type and quality; objects of the same type are inter-temporal substitutes. The current choice set is informative about the distribution over future choice sets. Thus, the presence of unchosen alternatives may rationally alter the agent's choice. Under some simple assumptions, the optimal policy exhibits context-dependent choice behavior, such as the decoy effect and choice overload. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights...
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作者：Rivera, Thomas J.
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper analyzes the issue of implementing correlated and communication equilibria when pre-play communication is restricted to a particular network (e.g., a hierarchy). When communication between the mediator and the players is not direct and private, as assumed when invoking the revelation principle, there may be incentives for other players in the communication network to misbehave while players report their private information to the mediator and the mediator sends suggested actions to ...
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作者：Hann-Caruthers, Wade; Martynov, Vadim V.; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：In the classical herding literature, agents receive a private signal regarding a binary state of nature, and sequentially choose an action, after observing the actions of their predecessors. When the informativeness of private signals is unbounded, it is known that agents converge to the correct action and correct belief. We study how quickly convergence occurs, and show that it happens more slowly than it does when agents observe signals. However, we also show that the speed of learning from ...
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作者：Dean, Mark; Kibris, Ozgur; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan
作者单位：Columbia University; Sabanci University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We introduce and axiomatically characterize a model of status quo bias in which the status quo affects choices by both imposing psychological constraints and focusing attention. The resulting Limited Attention Status Quo Bias model can explain both the findings that status quo bias is more prevalent in larger choice sets and that the introduction of a status quo can change choices between non-status quo alternatives. Existing models of status quo bias are inconsistent with the former finding w...
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作者：van Bruggen, Paul; Heufer, Jan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Varian (1988) showed that the utility maximization hypothesis cannot be falsified when only a subset of goods is observed. We show that this result does not hold under the assumptions that unobserved prices and expenditures remain constant. These assumptions are naturally satisfied in laboratory settings where the world outside the lab remains unchanged during the experiment. Hence for so-called induced budget experiments the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference is a necessary and sufficie...
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作者：Nesterov, Alexander S.
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：I consider the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are absent and an outside option may exist. I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) ex-post efficiency and envy freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness, and (3) ordinal effi...
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作者：Troyan, Peter
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：The standard approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed, disinterested third party who, prior to the auction, designs and implements a collusive mechanism. In environments where collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties, this approach may neglect information leakages from simply a proposal to collude. We consider a model of collusion where one informed bidder proposes to another, as in Eso and Schummer (2004). We allow for general inte...
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作者：Hoy, Michael; Huang, Rachel J.
作者单位：University of Guelph; National Central University; University of North Carolina; North Carolina Central University
摘要：This note develops a new approach to measuring discrimination. A partial ordering of discrimination patterns is proposed that is consistent with the properties of second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD), which are related to changes in the distributions of either the reference (advantaged) or comparison (disadvantaged) group, while keeping the other group's distribution unchanged. Furthermore, a corresponding summary index is derived. This index provides a complete ordering to rank discrimina...
