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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Glasgow
摘要：We consider convex dynamic programs with general (bounded) recursive utilities. The Contraction Mapping Theorem fails when the utility aggregator does not obey any discounting property. This failure occurs even with traditional aggregators and certainty equivalent specifications. However, the Bellman operator admits a unique fixed point when an interior policy is feasible. This happens because utility values are unique at interior consumption plans and, when an interior perturbation is feasibl...
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作者：Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Piacentino, Giorgia
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital. We find that they make their contracts depend on public information, e.g. credit ratings or benchmark indices, as a way to attract flows, rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems, as has been emphasized in the literature. Unfortunately, asset managers' competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom: asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is so...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey; University of Vienna
摘要：We consider games with an endogenous sharing rule and provide conditions for the invariance of the equilibrium set, i.e., for the existence of a common equilibrium set for the games defined by each possible sharing rule. Applications of our results include Bertrand competition with convex costs, electoral competition, and contests. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lu, Jay; Saito, Kota
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We provide a theory of random intertemporal choice. Agents exhibit stochastic choice over consumption due to preference shocks to discounting attitudes. We first demonstrate how the distribution of these preference shocks can be uniquely identified from random choice data. We then provide axiomatic characterizations of some common random discounting models, including exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In particular, we show how testing for exponential discounting under stochastic ch...
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作者：Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：The competing mechanisms literature is extended to a market setting in which firms have fixed capacity, and there is a continuum of consumers who desire multiple units and can only purchase from one firm. Firms choose incentive compatible mechanisms in which consumers report their utility types; consumption of the good and payments of the numeraire are continuous functions of the reports. Uniform price auctions with reserve prices, reinterpreted as direct mechanisms, are not consistent with eq...
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作者：Glode, Vincent; Opp, Christian C.; Zhang, Xingtan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We characterize optimal voluntary disclosures by a privately informed agent facing a counterparty endowed with market power in a bilateral transaction. Although disclosures reveal some of the agent's private information, they may increase his information rents by mitigating the counterparty's incentives to resort to inefficient screening. We show that when disclosures are restricted to be ex post verifiable, the informed agent optimally designs a disclosure plan that is partial and that implem...
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作者：Guney, Begum; Richter, Michael; Tsur, Matan
作者单位：Ozyegin University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Vienna
摘要：Numerous studies and experiments suggest that aspirations for desired but perhaps unavailable alternatives influence decisions. A common finding is that an unavailable aspiration steers agents to choose similar available alternatives. We propose and axiomatically characterize a choice theory consistent with this aspirational effect. Similarity is modeled using a subjective metric derived from choice data. This model offers implications for consumer welfare and its distribution between rich and...
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作者：Kendall, Chad; Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We experimentally study the market selection hypothesis, the classical claim that competitive markets bankrupt traders with biased beliefs, allowing unbiased competitors to survive. Prior theoretical work suggests the hypothesis can fail if biased traders over-invest in the market relative to their less biased competitors. Subjects in our experiment divide wealth between consumption and a pair of securities whose values are linked to a difficult reasoning problem. While most subjects in our ma...
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作者：Michau, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：To investigate secular stagnation, I add two features to a standard Ramsey model with money: (i) House-holds have a preference for wealth; (ii) Wages are downward rigid. In this framework, there exists a frictionless neoclassical steady state equilibrium characterized by a low natural real interest rate. In addition, if wages are sufficiently rigid and the natural real interest rate sufficiently low, then there also exists a Keynesian secular stagnation steady state characterized by under-empl...
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作者：Blume, Lawrence E.; Cogley, Timothy; Easley, David A.; Sargent, Thomas J.; Tsyrennikov, Viktor
作者单位：Cornell University; New York University
摘要：If two rational agents want to trade and there are no externalities, then trade is Pareto improving. Economists generally oppose restrictions on such trade. Complete markets allocations are Pareto optimal and thus complete markets are generally viewed as good. But when individuals want to trade because of heterogeneous beliefs, this standard argument is less compelling. We illustrate this in a standard general equilibrium setting and explore potential social benefits from restrictions on trade...
