Decentralizing constrained-efficient allocations in the Lagos-Wright pure currency economy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bajaj, Ayushi; Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Silva, Mario Rafael
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.011
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-13
• 关键词: money; Divisibility; implementation

摘要

This paper offers two ways to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation of the Lagos - Wright (2005) pure currency economy. The first way has divisible money, take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers, and a transfer scheme financed by money creation. If agents are sufficiently patient, the first best is achieved for finite money growth rates. if agents are impatient, the equilibrium allocation approaches the constrained efficient allocation asymptotically as the money growth rate tends to infinity. The second way has indivisible money, take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers, and no government intervention. We discuss the strict implementation of constrained-efficient allocations and the applicability of our scheme to economies with Lucas trees, endogenous participation, match-specific heterogeneity, and sequential competitive markets. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.