Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans
• 署名单位: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.006
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 174-212
• 关键词: Information disclosure; Conjugate disclosure; Bayesian persuasion

摘要

We consider a single-item, independent private value auction environment with two bidders: a leader, who knows his valuation, and a follower, who privately chooses how much to learn about his valuation. We show that, under some conditions, an ex-post efficient revenue-maximizing auction which solicits bids sequentially partially discloses the leader's bid to the follower, to influence his learning. The disclosure rule that emerges is novel; it may reveal to the follower only a pair of bids to which the leader's actual bid belongs. The identified disclosure rule, relative to the first -best, induces the follower to learn less when the leader's valuation is low and more when the leader's valuation is high. (C)2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.