Teams promise but do not deliver

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nielsen, Kirby; Bhattacharya, Puja; Kagel, John H.; Sengupta, Arjun
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.013
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 420-432
• 关键词: Trust game; Hidden-action; Non-binding communication; Teams versus individuals

摘要

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates, but this does not extend to teams. While teams promise to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for team behavior. We rule out explanations hypothesizing that concern for partner's payoff drives team outcomes, as absent within-team communication, promise fulfillment rates increase compared to individuals. Rather, the results are consistent with the idea that communication between teammates provides support for self-serving behavior. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.