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作者：Nath, Swaprava; Sandholm, Tuomas
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We consider efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms with bounded valuations that are approximately efficient. We show that a deterministic, strategyproof, and budget-balanced mechanism must have a sink whose valuation is ignored in the decision, and is compensated with all the leftover money. We find a tight lower bound on the inefficiencies of s...
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作者：Izquierdo, Luis R.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：ABED is free and open-source software for simulating evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We explain how ABED can be used to simulate a wide range of dynamics considered in the literature and many novel dynamics. In doing so, we introduce a general model of revisions for dynamic evolutionary models, one that decomposes strategy updates into selection of candidate strategies, payoff determination, and choice among candidates. Using examples, we explore ways in which simulations can...
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作者：Maaser, Nicola; Paetzel, Fabian; Traub, Stefan
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differen...
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作者：Stauber, Ronald
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：The term belief function is generally used to refer to a class of capacities that can be viewed as representing ambiguity averse preferences. This paper introduces a definition of equilibrium for normal-form games with ambiguous beliefs, where belief functions are used to describe strategic uncertainty. To capture independence of strategies and beliefs, a novel notion of a strategic product integral is introduced for belief functions, based on their Mobius transforms, and shown to be different...
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作者：Parise, Francesca; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness, convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditi...
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作者：Rud, Olga A.; Rabanal, Jean Paul; Sharifova, Manizha
作者单位：Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT); Monash University; University of the Pacific
摘要：We test in a controlled laboratory environment whether traders in a bilateral exchange internalize the impact of their actions on market prices better than in a large market. In this model, traders choose asset holdings, constrained by a technology frontier. Next, each trader experiences a random shock which makes only one type of asset profitable. In a general equilibrium environment with incomplete markets, this leads to pecuniary externalities because traders increase scarce asset holdings ...
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作者：Boosey, Luke; Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Max Planck Society; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：We study group contests where group sizes are stochastic and unobservable to participants at the time of investment. When the joint distribution of group sizes is symmetric, with expected group size k, the symmetric equilibrium aggregate investment is lower than in a symmetric group contest with commonly known fixed group size k. A similar result holds for two groups with asymmetric distributions of sizes. For the symmetric case, the reduction in individual and aggregate investment due to grou...
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作者：Breitmoser, Yves
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：Overbidding in auctions has been attributed to e.g. risk aversion, loser regret, level-k, and cursedness, relying on varying identifying assumptions. I argue that type projection organizes these findings and largely captures observed behavior. Type projection formally models that people tend to believe others have object values similar to their own- a robust psychological phenomenon that naturally applies to auctions. First, I show that type projection generates the main behavioral phenomena o...
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作者：Stern, Ari; Tettenhorst, Alexander
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry, and linearity properties. Consequently, we obtain a new characterization of the classical Shapley value as the value of the grand coalition in each player's component game. We also relate this decomposition to a least-squares problem involving inessential ga...
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作者：Devanur, Nikhil R.; Peres, Yuval; Sivan, Balasubramanian
作者单位：Microsoft; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to the same buyer every day via a posted price. The buyer's private value for the item is drawn initially from a publicly known distribution F and remains the same throughout. A key aspect of this game is that the seller might try to learn the buyer's private ...
