Proper scoring rules with general preferences: A dual characterization of optimal reports

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, Christopher R.; Healy, Paul J.; Lambert, Nicolas S.
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.012
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 322-341
• 关键词: Scoring rule; Probability forecast; General preferences

摘要

Proper scoring rules incentivize truthful probability reports from risk-neutral individuals. For individuals with much more general preferences (including risk and ambiguity aversion) we use duality techniques to characterize the optimal report in any proper scoring rule. We apply this characterization to several well-known families of preferences, and provide several applications. In particular, for the case of CARA and CRRA preferences we (1) can back out true beliefs from optimal reports, (2) show that the quadratic scoring rule minimizes deviations from truthfulness, and (3) provide a two-step procedure in which the agent reports her risk aversion parameter and her belief truthfully. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.