Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lehrer, Ehud; Teper, Roee
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.008
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 440-452
• 关键词: Set-valued games; core; balancedness; logrolling

摘要

We study allocation problems when agents negotiate across different agendas. Unlike existing papers on multi-agenda disputes, we consider environments in which resources are constrained and investing (time or effort) in one agenda reduces the ability to invest in other agendas. We introduce a class of cooperative games, referred to as set-valued games (SVG): The value of each coalition is a subset of payoff vectors. Each vector is associated with a distribution of the resources that the coalition may allocate across the agendas. In this environment we introduce and analyze the notion of the core. We show that the core allows for more cooperation opportunities and exchanging favors than existing cooperative multi-agenda models. Proving this relies on a general notion of a comparative advantage. It is shown that the classical core characterization, resorting to duality, does not hold in the current setup. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.