-
作者：Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：We examine a timing game with complete information and observable actions when there is a second-mover advantage. Allowing for heterogenous payoffs between players and for both leader and follower payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, we develop a new solution method to characterize the pure-strategy equilibria. Sometimes these resemble familiar second-mover advantage equilibria from the literature. However, we show, despite a follower advantage at all times for both players, ...
-
作者：Garratt, Rodney; Georganas, Sotiris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We run experiments on second-price auctions with resale opportunities, where a zerovalue bidder, called a speculator, is commonly known to exist. Garratt and Troger (2006a) show that there is a continuum of speculative equilibria, apart from the standard bid-your-value one, in which the speculator gets the good in the first stage auction with positive probability. She pays a price of zero and resells it to the private-value bidder in the second stage. In the most extreme equilibrium, the priva...
-
作者：Jain, Ritesh
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：A (deterministic) social choice correspondence F, mapping states into outcomes, is rationalizably implementable provided that there exists a mechanism such that the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes recommended by F. We provide a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation, called r-monotonicity. This condition, when combined with some other auxiliary conditions, is also sufficient when there are at least three agents. (C) 2021 Published...
-
作者：Chen, Yanbin; Li, Sanxi; Lin, Kai; Yu, Jun
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This article studies a sequential search model in which consumers can purchase a product without incurring a search cost to inspect the match value, which we call blind buying. We show that the optimal search policy is no longer as per Weitzman (1979). When the match value has a symmetric distribution, both consumers and firms are indifferent to the search order, conditional on that blind buying does not take place in the first stage. Blind buying always increases total welfare, and increases ...
-
作者：Bigoni, Maria; Bortolotti, Stefania; Ozen, Efsan Nas
作者单位：University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics; The World Bank
摘要：Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior. We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich counterpart with whom they had no previous interaction. We test whether the emergence of antisocial behavior depends only on the level of inequality, or also on the conditions under which inequality occurs. We compare an environment in which the ri...
-
作者：Bando, Keisuke; Kawasaki, Ryo
作者单位：Shinshu University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is...
-
作者：Dal Bo, Pedro; Frechette, Guillaume R.; Kim, Jeongbin
作者单位：Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study the determinants of efficient behavior in stag hunt games (2x2 symmetric coordination games with Pareto ranked equilibria) using data from eight previous experiments on stag hunt games and a new experiment that allows for a more systematic variation of parameters. We find that subjects do not necessarily play the efficient action (stag), stressing the importance of strategic uncertainty in coordination games. While the frequency of playing stag is greater when stag is risk dominant, t...
-
作者：Pongou, Roland; Tchantcho, Bertrand
作者单位：University of Ottawa; Harvard University; University of Yaounde I; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：A round-robin political tournament is an election format where multiple candidates contest in pairs, and votes are aggregated using a general rule to form a social ranking. We formalize this tournament as a strategic form game and provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which truthful voting is a Nash equilibrium. Building on this analysis, we study the concept of effective power, defined as a voter's ability to bring about a social ranking that maximizes his preferences. We show th...
-
作者：Dominiak, Adam; Eichberger, Jurgen
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We propose a new solution concept, called Context-Dependent Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (CD-EUA), for strategic games where players' beliefs may be influenced by exogenous context-related information. Players' beliefs about the strategic behavior of their opponents are represented by belief functions. The notion of belief functions allows us to combine exogenous context information in the spirit of Schelling (1960) with endogenous equilibrium beliefs about the opponents' behavior in analogy to...
-
作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Sun, Chaoran
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We introduce the value-free (v-f) reductions, operators that map a coalitional game played by a set of players to another similar game played by a subset of those players. We propose properties that v-f reductions may satisfy, we provide a theory of duality, and we characterize several v-f reductions (among which the value-free version of the reduced games proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989, and Oishi et al., 2016). Unlike reduced games, introduced to characterize values in terms of consist...
