Preemption with a second-mover advantage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 294-309
• 关键词: Timing games; Second-mover advantage; preemption

摘要

We examine a timing game with complete information and observable actions when there is a second-mover advantage. Allowing for heterogenous payoffs between players and for both leader and follower payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, we develop a new solution method to characterize the pure-strategy equilibria. Sometimes these resemble familiar second-mover advantage equilibria from the literature. However, we show, despite a follower advantage at all times for both players, that there can be a preemption equilibrium. Our generic solution method can be applied to a range of applications, such as market entry, innovation and holdout games for rival sellers of complementary assets. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.