Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bando, Keisuke; Kawasaki, Ryo
• 署名单位: Shinshu University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.007
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 211-223
• 关键词: Generalized assignment problem; core; stable set; Path to stability

摘要

We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.