Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jain, Ritesh
• 署名单位: Academia Sinica - Taiwan
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 47-66
• 关键词: Implementation; social choice correspondences; r-Monotonicity; rationalizability

摘要

A (deterministic) social choice correspondence F, mapping states into outcomes, is rationalizably implementable provided that there exists a mechanism such that the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes recommended by F. We provide a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation, called r-monotonicity. This condition, when combined with some other auxiliary conditions, is also sufficient when there are at least three agents. (C) 2021 Published by Elsevier Inc.