The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dal Bo, Pedro; Frechette, Guillaume R.; Kim, Jeongbin
• 署名单位: Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.010
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 352-368
• 关键词: Coordination games; strategic uncertainty; equilibrium selection

摘要

We study the determinants of efficient behavior in stag hunt games (2x2 symmetric coordination games with Pareto ranked equilibria) using data from eight previous experiments on stag hunt games and a new experiment that allows for a more systematic variation of parameters. We find that subjects do not necessarily play the efficient action (stag), stressing the importance of strategic uncertainty in coordination games. While the frequency of playing stag is greater when stag is risk dominant, there is still large variation in behavior that cannot be explained by risk dominance. Part of this variation is explained by the risk arising from strategic uncertainty that we measure with the size of the basin of attraction of stag. We also explore the importance of other determinants of efficient behavior and we show that the results are robust to paying subjects using the lottery method in an attempt to induce risk neutral preferences. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.