Auctions with speculators: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garratt, Rodney; Georganas, Sotiris
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 256-270
• 关键词: Auctions; resale; experiment; speculators

摘要

We run experiments on second-price auctions with resale opportunities, where a zerovalue bidder, called a speculator, is commonly known to exist. Garratt and Troger (2006a) show that there is a continuum of speculative equilibria, apart from the standard bid-your-value one, in which the speculator gets the good in the first stage auction with positive probability. She pays a price of zero and resells it to the private-value bidder in the second stage. In the most extreme equilibrium, the private-value bidder always bids zero and the speculator obtains the good. We find that bidders frequently play strategies that are consistent with a speculative equilibrium. When the speculative equilibrium is not observed, the presence of the speculator leads to more aggressive bidding by private-value bidders that results in increased revenue for the seller. An increase in the number of private-value bidders makes speculation harder, but does not eliminate it. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.