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作者：Merzoni, Guido; Trombetta, Federico
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：We study the implications of state-dependent costs of policy mismatch in political agency models where politicians have reputational concerns and good politicians share the same objectives as the voters. We find that state-dependent costs can increase the set of parameters where pandering is an equilibrium strategy. Indeed, in our model, pandering can arise even without office rents. Moreover, we show that voters do not necessarily prefer biased politicians to be in favour of the policy that p...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：Afacan (2017) shows that the cumulative offer process respects improvements under the unilateral substitutes, the law of aggregate demand, and the irrelevance of rejected contracts conditions. This note indicates that the proof does not go through. However, a completely new proof is provided, verifying that the result remains correct.(C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：McMurray, Joseph
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：Adding candidates to a one-dimensional common-interest voting model, this paper shows that catering to centrist voters can lower social welfare. The electoral benefit of doing so is weak, so candidates polarize substantially in equilibrium, resolving a long-standing empirical puzzle. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Noda, Shunya
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Tokyo
摘要：We consider matching-mechanism design in an environment in which agents acquire information about their preferences endogenously. Information is costly; thus, agents acquire information only if it is relevant to their decision-making. Agents' beliefs about their choice set (i.e., the set of objects each agent can obtain) are therefore crucial for incentives in information acquisition. This study demonstrates that the implementation of matching mechanisms changes the equilibrium consequence bec...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Stauber, Ronald
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：In the context of normal-form games with complete information, we introduce a notion of correlated equilibrium that allows partial delegation to a mediator and ambiguity in the correlation device. Without ambiguity, the sets of equilibrium action distributions are equivalent to those for coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial, 1974). With correlation devices that incorporate ambiguity, any action distribution that Pareto dominates a coarse correlated equilibrium or a correlated equilib...
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作者：Jaskiewicz, Anna; Nowak, Andrzej S.
作者单位：Wroclaw University of Science & Technology; University of Zielona Gora
摘要：We show that right-continuous monotone strategies used in Markov perfect equilibria for economic growth models and related dynamic games can be recognised as members of the Hilbert space of square integrable functions of the state variable. We provide an application of this result to a bequest game and point out that this result also holds for the class of left-continuous monotone functions. The result is fundamental for using the Schauder fixed point theorem. Furthermore, it considerably simp...
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作者：Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Helland, Leif; Knutsen, Magnus Vage
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We experimentally investigate the role of two-sided reputation-building in dynamic bargaining. In the absence of outside options, rational bargainers have an incentive to imitate obstinate types that are committed to an aggressive demand, inducing delay. Outside options remove this incentive and ensure immediate agreement whenever two rational bargainers match. Our data support the hypothesis that outside options cut down on imitation and ensure timely agreements, but only if subjects share a ...
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作者：Kaufmann, Marc
摘要：I model individuals working on a long-term task who, due to projection bias, underestimate changes in marginal disutility. At the start of each day, when current marginal disutility is low, such individuals overestimate how much they will work, and as they grow tired from working, they plan to work less and less. Despite these fluctuating plans, when they face decreasing returns to effort, they work optimally, yet if they commit in advance, they overcommit. When facing increasing returns, they...
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作者：Fugger, Nicolas; Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Mannheim; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a two-period production project. The buyer lacks the commitment not to renegotiate the contractual terms in the second period. The prospect of renegotiation makes suppliers cautious about the information revealed in period one. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism and highlight the role of information design for its implementation. We show that the buyer can achieve the full commitment surplus with the appropriate information d...
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作者：Hyndman, Kyle; Walker, Matthew J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Newcastle University - UK
摘要：We conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment but, rather than bargaining over money, subjects bargain over lottery tickets for a mutually exclusive prize. We find that proposers offer a significantly lower percentage of lottery tickets to responders than the equivalent offer when bargaining over money. In contrast, responders have a significantly higher acceptance threshold, which is consistent with responders being risk averse and possessing ex-post fairness concerns. This difference can be ...
