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作者：Karakostas, Alexandros; Kocher, Martin G.; Matzat, Dominik; Rau, Holger A.; Riewe, Gerhard
作者单位：ESSCA School of Management; University of Vienna; University of Gothenburg; University of Munich; University of Gottingen; University of Duisburg Essen
摘要：We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games where a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good to distribute it among team members. Our team allocator games are intended to cap-ture natural asymmetries in hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those in work teams. We show that introducing a team allocator leads to increased contributions in linear and best-shot public-good games. No effect can be fo...
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作者：Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Grosskopf, Brit
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Innsbruck
摘要：Competition for limited resources is ubiquitous in social and economic life and has sparked a large body of research on the determinants of competitive behavior. While we know a lot about the role of contextual factors and personality traits, the potential link between competitive behavior and physical appearance remains unexplored. In this study we test whether objective facial characteristics and subjective attractiveness ratings are related to the competitive behavior in the form of opting ...
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作者：Chaudhury, Ratul Das; Leister, C. Matthew; Rai, Birendra
作者单位：Monash University; Monash University
摘要：When can an interest group exploit polarization between political parties to its advantage? Building upon Battaglini and Patacchini (2018), we study a model where an interest group credibly promises payments to legislators conditional on voting for its preferred policy. A legislator can be directly susceptible to other legislators and value voting like them. The overall pattern of inter-legislator susceptibility determines the relative influence of individual legislators, and therefore the rel...
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作者：Manea, Mihai; Maskin, Eric
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Harvard University
摘要：We study the optimality of allowing the designer to withhold or damage resources in Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms for bilateral trade with independent private values. The following results hold when the buyer and the seller have discrete value distributions. Burning money or withholding the good from both traders never enhances welfare. Similarly, damaging the good for the buyer cannot increase welfare. By contrast, damaging the good for the seller may improve welfare. However, such...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Miralles, Antonio; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Messina; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：In a variant of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)'s model that allows agents to start out with different endowments, we develop a pseudo-market procedure that allows the policymaker to decide to what extent individual endowment differences shall be balanced by the aver-age endowment. Our procedure sidesteps the known non-existence problem of Walrasian equilibria, and finds an efficient and balanced individually-rational allocation. Envy in our procedure is justified in a utilitarian sense: an envy...
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作者：Feldman, Michal; Shabtai, Galia
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The literature on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of simple auctions employs a no-overbidding assumption but has completely overlooked the no-underbidding phenomenon, which is evident in empirical studies on variants of the second price auction. In this work, we provide a theoretical foundation for the no-underbidding phenomenon. We study the PoA of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (S2PA) under a new natural condition of no underbidding, meaning that agents never bid on items less than their margina...
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作者：Ayoade, Nickesha; Papai, Szilvia
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We introduce and study a large family of rules for many-to-one matching problems, the Preference Rank Partitioned (PRP) rules. PRP rules are student-proposing Deferred Acceptance rules, where the schools select among applicants in each round taking into account both the students' preferences and the schools' priorities. In a PRP rule each school first seeks to select students based on priority rank classes, and subsequently based on preference rank classes. PRP rules include many well-known ma...
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作者：Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology; Shandong University
摘要：The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages, the winning probability shifts towards the rising power. We find fewer preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated inter...
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作者：Abe, Takaaki; Nakada, Satoshi
作者单位：Kyushu University; Tokyo University of Science
摘要：This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules, which is referred to as the in-group egalitarian Owen values, that integrates two seemingly conflicting principles-marginalism and egalitarianism-in the framework of cooperative games with coalition structures. This class of allocation rules facilitates the use of different principles of allocation in different layers of a social structure such as allocation across coalitions and within a coalition. Therefore, each coalition can employ its s...
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作者：Ortega, Josue; Klein, Thilo
作者单位：Queens University Belfast; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improve...
