The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ortega, Josue; Klein, Thilo
• 署名单位: Queens University Belfast; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 515-528
• 关键词: School choice; Rank-minimizing; Random matching markets

摘要

We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improves the placement of the worst-off student. Furthermore, RM generates less justified envy than TTC. We corroborate our findings using data on school admissions in Budapest.Crown Copyright (c) 2023 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by-nc -nd /4 .0/).