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作者：Guha, Brishti
作者单位：Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
摘要：This is the first paper to study accomplice plea bargains when motivated jurors incur an effort cost. I find that a prosecutor who wishes to ensure punishment for the guilty, and acquittal for the innocent, induces a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is fully separating, simultaneously minimizing court costs as well as jurors' cognitive efforts. In this equilibrium, a very harsh plea bargain (with negligible plea discounting) is offered, and is accepted by all guilty defendants, and re...
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作者：Uyanik, Metin; Yengin, Duygu
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of Adelaide
摘要：Complementarity is common in land-assembly problems, such as a developer buying the entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Holdout (delay or block of projects by sellers) is common in these problems under unanimity-rule. Motivated by the recent policy practices in strata-sales, we introduce a new bargaining model with quotarule. We show that under quota-rule, there is no holdout when there are two sellers or players are sufficiently patient. No-holdout equilibrium is un...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Deroian, Frederic; Safi, Shahir
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We consider agents organized in an undirected network of local complementarities. A principal with a fixed budget offers costly bilateral contracts in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We study contracts rewarding effort exceeding the effort made in the absence of the principal. First, targeting a subgroup of the whole society becomes optimal under substantial contracting costs, which significantly increases the computational complexity of the principal's problem. In particular, und...
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作者：Ostrizek, Franz; Sartori, Elia
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); University of Naples Federico II
摘要：We propose a tractable framework to introduce externalities in a screening model. Agents differ in both payoff-type and influence-type (ranking how beneficial their actions are for others). Applications range from pricing network goods to regulating industries that create externalities. Inefficiencies arise only if the payoff-type is unobservable. When both dimensions are unobserved, the optimal allocation satisfies lexicographic monotonicity: increasing along the payoff-type to satisfy incent...
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作者：Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation model in which outside options are available to agents, we prove two results that demonstrate the interplay between strategy-proofness and outside options. The two results treat deterministic allocation mechanisms and random allocation mechanisms in a unified way. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down agents' probabilities of consuming outside opti...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Hafalir et al. (2022) introduce a model of interdistrict school choice. We show that any district's admission rule satisfying their assumptions is uniquely rationalized by a collection of schools' choice functions satisfying substitutability and acceptance. We then establish that all students weakly prefer the outcome of the cumulative offer process (COP) under the school-based admissions to the outcome under the district-based admissions. This has the implication that if students prefer the i...
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作者：Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission cost is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission cost or the lowest submission cost is optimal.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lee, Natalie
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：In dynamic strategic interactions, a player who spies the opponent's actions might have incentives to feign ignorance and forgo immediate payoffs so that he can earn higher future payoffs by manipulating the opponent's suspicion. I model and experimentally implement the situation as a two-stage hide-and-seek game. A substantial share of the spying players fails to feign ignorance, despite the empirical suboptimality of the behavior and their largely correct predictions about opponents' suspici...
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作者：Bade, Sophie; Segal-Halevi, Erel
摘要：Are fairness and efficiency compatible in behavioral welfare economics? Assuming multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their various objectives into complete and transitive rankings, we call an allocation unambiguously-fair if it fair according to every self of every agent. We show that efficiency is generically compatible with the unambiguous fair-share guarantee, and - in two agent economies - with unambiguous no-envy. But in some larger economies, no efficient allocation satis...
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作者：Kivinen, Steven
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：We consider the equity-manipulability trade-off when voting over two alternatives. Pairwise equity is a weakening of anonymity requiring certain permutations of the voters' identities to preserve the outcome of the election. B-robust group strategy-proofness (t-RGSP) and fine robust group strategy-proofness (FRGSP) are notions of group strategy-proofness that allow voters to have different beliefs about players' types (Kivinen and Tumennasan, 2021). Our main results show that, under mild condi...
