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作者：Battiston, Pietro; Harrison, Sharon G.
作者单位：University of Pisa; Columbia University
摘要：Models with sunspot equilibria have long been a topic of interest among economists. It then became an interesting question to ask whether there is empirical support for their existence. One approach to answer this question is through lab experiments. A growing literature has not only successfully reproduced these equilibria in the lab, but also improved our understanding of the conditions under which they might emerge. We study the importance of information provision, and how it affects conver...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Madmon, Omer; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a two-stage Bayesian persuasion model in which a third-party platform controls the information available to the sender about users' preferences. We aim to characterize the optimal information disclosure policy of the platform, which maximizes average user utility, under the assumption that the sender also follows its own optimal policy. We show that this problem can be reduced to a model of market segmentation, in which probabilities are mapped into valuations. We t...
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作者：Schwirplies, Claudia; Lange, Andreas
作者单位：Philipps University Marburg; University of Hamburg
摘要：We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in settings with posted offers. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggests a split between herself, the responder and a charitable donation. By reneging on initial pledges, dishonest proposers can change the final allocation to their advantage. Providing ex post information on actual donations while leaving the contract incomplete outperforms a complete contract wh...
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作者：Cembrano, Javier; Fischer, Felix; Hannon, David; Klimm, Max
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic mechanism with an additive performance guarantee of O(n((1+kappa)/2)) in a setting with n individuals where each individual casts O(n(kappa)) nominations, where kappa is an element of[0, 1]. This bound is O(root n) for kappa = 0 and O(n) for kappa = 1. The l...
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作者：Blonski, Matthias; Herbold, Daniel
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a Strict Coasian Institution for which transaction costs impede an efficient asset reallocation after a brea...
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作者：Nosenzo, Daniele; Xiao, Erte; Xue, Nina
作者单位：Aarhus University; Monash University
摘要：The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher's motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent's outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other ...
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作者：Tsodikovich, Yevgeny; Venel, Xavier; Zseleva, Anna
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Luiss Guido Carli University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study how switching costs affect the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game.
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作者：Valkanova, Kremena
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：Ordinal random utility models (RUMs) are based on the presumption that fluctuating preferences drive stochastic choices. We study a novel property of RUM subclasses called exclusiveness, satisfied whenever the supports of all RUM representations of stochastic choice data, rationalizable by a RUM over preferences within a specific domain, also belong to that domain. We demonstrate that well-known preference domains such as the single-peaked, single-dipped, triple-wise value- restricted and peak...
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作者：Pham, Hien; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：National Economics University - Vietnam; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider an auction design problem with private values, where the seller and bidders may enjoy heterogeneous priors about their (possibly correlated) valuations. Each bidder forms an (interim) belief about the others based on his own prior updated by observing his own value. If the seller faces uncertainty about the bidders' priors, even if he knows that the bidders' priors are within any given distance from his, he may find it worst -case optimal to propose a dominantstrategy auction mecha...
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作者：Abizadeh, Arash; Vetta, Adrian
作者单位：McGill University; McGill University; McGill University
摘要：The classical measures of voting power are based on players' decisiveness or full causal efficacy in vote configurations or divisions. We design an alternative, recursive measure departing from this classical approach. We motivate the measure via an axiomatic characterisation based on reasonable axioms and by offering two complementary interpretations of its meaning: first, we interpret the measure to represent, not the player's probability of being decisive in a voting structure, but its expe...
