-
作者：Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco
作者单位：Otto Friedrich University Bamberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We experimentally investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), ...
-
作者：Wang, Tse-Min; Heine, Florian; van Witteloostuijn, Arjen
作者单位：National Taipei University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Antwerp
摘要：Pro-social risk-taking involves the willingness to commit resources to initiatives and opportunities with a social benefit, as well as a risk of costly failure. These situations often occur in an environment in which groups compete for resources. In these contexts of intergroup conflict, often individuals make personal sacrifices on a voluntary basis, involving considerable risks of failure. We study the context of pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict by extending the volunteer's dil...
-
作者：Prokopovych, Pavlo; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：Kyiv School of Economics; University of Iowa
摘要：We introduce a new approach to studying the existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in an n-player single-prize contest model that covers both perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests. The contestants have continua of possible types and bids, atomless type distributions, and their valuations and costs might depend not only on their own bids and types but also on other bidders' bids and types. Many, quite different contests are covered by our generalized contest...
-
作者：Balzer, Benjamin; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We introduce informational punishment to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective...
-
作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Feldman, Paul; Servatka, Maros; Tarraso, Jorge; Vadovic, Radovan
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Economics Bratislava; Carleton University
摘要：Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: the taxi market in Mexico City. We find a remarkably high degree of trustworthiness, even with price-haggling which was predicted to reduce trustworthiness.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper studies the design of efficient mechanisms for repeated bilateral trade in settings where (i) traders' values and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and available to participate in the mechanism at random times. Under a weak condition, analogous to the non-overlapping supports condition of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), efficient trade is only feasible if the mechanism runs an expected budget deficit. The smallest such deficit is attainable by a se...
-
作者：Jeong, Daeyoung; Kim, Semin
作者单位：Hanyang University; Hanyang University; Yonsei University
摘要：We consider a constitution as a pair of voting rules (f, F) in which the given rule f is for the decision on the final outcome, and the base rule F is for the decision on the change of a voting rule. Which constitutions would stably survive? We define the concepts of interim/ex-post stability, whereby agents' preferences over the outcomes are privately/publicly known when they change a voting rule. We fully characterize the set of interim stable constitutions, which consist of anonymous voting...
-
作者：Aradhye, Aditya; Flesch, Janos; Staudigl, Mathias; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：Czech Technical University Prague; Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, in which the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver to either stop the game, or to continue. The receiver, only seeing the message, then decides to stop the game, or to continue. The payoff to each player is a function of the state when the receiver quits, with higher states leading to better payoffs. We prove existence and uniqueness of responsive Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) when players are suffici...
-
作者：Steg, Jan-Henrik; Thijssen, Jacco J. J.
作者单位：University of Graz; University of York - UK
摘要：We study strategic investment in continuous time with positive externalities of changing magnitude. Our model particularly allows for two correlated risk factors. Constructing subgame-perfect equilibria with pure and mixed strategies, we observe the novel effect that it is important for the firms to anticipatepreemption. In fact, the presence of a second risk factor implies also an additional strategic risk. We quantify the associated extra waiting cost and show that it is ex ante uncertain wh...
-
作者：Lorecchio, Caio; Monte, Daniel
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We consider information censoring through finite memory as a device against bad reputational concerns. Our class of constrained information policies resembles common practices in online reputation systems, on which customers increasingly rely whenever hiring experts. In a world of repeated interactions between a long-lived expert and short-lived customers, Ely and Valimaki (2003) show that unlimited record-keeping may induce the expert to overchoose a certain action, seeking reputational gains...
