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作者：Ba, Cuimin; Gindin, Alice
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Middlebury College
摘要：This paper studies the long-term interaction between two overconfident agents who choose how much effort to exert while learning about their environment. Overconfidence causes agents to underestimate either a common fundamental, such as the underlying quality of their project, or their counterpart's ability, to justify their worse-than-expected performance. We show that in many settings, agents create informational externalities for each other. When informational externalities are positive, th...
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作者：Asheim, Geir B.; Brunnschweiler, Thomas
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：After having observed a deviation from backward induction, a player might deem the opponent prone to deviate from backward induction again, making it worthwhile to deviate themself. Such reaction might make the deviation by the opponent worthwhile in the first place-which is the backward induction paradox. This argument against backward induction cannot be made in games where all players choose only once on each path. While strategic-form perfect equilibrium yields backward induction in games ...
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作者：Nicolo, Antonio; Salmaso, Pietro; Sen, Arunava; Yadav, Sonal
作者单位：University of Padua; University of Manchester; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Umea University
摘要：We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if eit...
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作者：Antic, Nemanja; Persico, Nicola
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper provides a refinement that uniquely selects the ex-ante Pareto dominant equilibrium in a cheap talk game, provided one exists. The refinement works by embedding any cheap talk game into a class of two-stage games where: in stage 1 sender and receiver can, at a cost, alter their preferences; and in stage 2 the cheap talk game is played. For such games, we show that a forward induction logic can be invoked to select the ex-ante Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the second stage. Cheap ta...
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作者：Karle, Heiko; Schumacher, Heiner; Volund, Rune
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Innsbruck; Aarhus University
摘要：We consider a model of product differentiation where consumers are uncertain about the qualities and prices of firms' products. They can inspect all products at zero cost. A share of consumers is expectation-based loss averse. For these consumers, buying products of varying quality and price creates disutility from gain-loss sensations. Even at modest degrees of loss aversion they may refrain from inspecting all products and choose an individual default that is strictly dominated in terms of s...
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作者：Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu; Yamamori, Tetsuo
作者单位：Future University Hakodate; Chuo University
摘要：This study explores asymmetric volunteer dilemma games in which players incur different costs for volunteering. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that a player with less cost is more likely to contribute at the equilibrium if it is risk dominant. We have re-examined this hypothesis theoretically and experimentally and found that even when focusing on risk-dominant equilibria, the explanatory power of the theory is not universal. An econometric comparison among several behavioral models including reg...
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作者：Burdea, Valeria; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Nottingham
摘要：We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We investigate the effect of evidence and verification control using three treatments: one where messages are unverifiable, one where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify and one where the sender has this ver...
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作者：Somogyi, Robert; Vergote, Wouter; Virag, Gabor
作者单位：Budapest University of Technology & Economics; heSam Universite; ESCP Business School; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; University of Toronto
摘要：There is ample empirical evidence documenting that large firms set significantly lower prices than smaller, capacity-constrained, firms. This is paradoxical in light of the standard theoretical result that large firms charge higher prices than small firms in models of price competition with capacity constraints. We argue that private information about capacity constraints can account for this puzzle. We provide concavity conditions on the demand and on the type distribution under which there e...
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作者：Ahrens, Steffen; Bitter, Lea; Bosch-Rosa, Ciril
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; European Central Bank; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：In this paper we study the effects that loss contracts-prepayments that can be clawed back later-have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. To do so, we investigate the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives are framed as an isomorphic loss contract. Contrary to most results in the loss contract literature, in our setup loss contracts ...
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作者：Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Barcelona
摘要：We examine the effect of the interim release of turnout information on elections in a model of a large electorate with a common voting cost, private values, and two alternatives. We consider that (i) one group of citizens votes before the rest and that (ii) the individuals of the second group know the first group's turnout-but not the vote tally-before they vote. The alternative with more votes in total is implemented. Our main result is that there is an equilibrium in which the ex-ante probab...
