Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Miralles, Antonio; Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Messina; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.002
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 428-443
• 关键词: Discrete allocation; endowment; Pseudo -market procedure; Balanced individual rationality

摘要

In a variant of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)'s model that allows agents to start out with different endowments, we develop a pseudo-market procedure that allows the policymaker to decide to what extent individual endowment differences shall be balanced by the aver-age endowment. Our procedure sidesteps the known non-existence problem of Walrasian equilibria, and finds an efficient and balanced individually-rational allocation. Envy in our procedure is justified in a utilitarian sense: an envying agent's endowment must make a lower contribution to standard weighted utilitarian welfare than that of the envied agent.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.