School choice with preference rank classes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ayoade, Nickesha; Papai, Szilvia
• 署名单位: Concordia University - Canada
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.011
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 317-341
• 关键词: Matching; school choice; deferred acceptance; Boston rule; STABILITY; EFFICIENCY; manipulation

摘要

We introduce and study a large family of rules for many-to-one matching problems, the Preference Rank Partitioned (PRP) rules. PRP rules are student-proposing Deferred Acceptance rules, where the schools select among applicants in each round taking into account both the students' preferences and the schools' priorities. In a PRP rule each school first seeks to select students based on priority rank classes, and subsequently based on preference rank classes. PRP rules include many well-known matching rules, such as the classic Deferred Acceptance rule, the Boston rule, the Chinese Application-Rejection rules of Chen and Kesten (2017), and the French Priority rules of Bonkoungou (2020), in addition to matching rules that have not been studied yet. We analyze the stability, efficiency and incentive properties of PRP rules in this unified framework.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.