The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karakostas, Alexandros; Kocher, Martin G.; Matzat, Dominik; Rau, Holger A.; Riewe, Gerhard
• 署名单位: ESSCA School of Management; University of Vienna; University of Gothenburg; University of Munich; University of Gottingen; University of Duisburg Essen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.005
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 73-87
• 关键词: Public goods provision; experiment; institutions; COOPERATION; Allocation power; teams

摘要

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games where a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good to distribute it among team members. Our team allocator games are intended to cap-ture natural asymmetries in hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those in work teams. We show that introducing a team allocator leads to increased contributions in linear and best-shot public-good games. No effect can be found in the weakest-link pub-lic good. The team allocator uses her power to distribute benefits in a way that motivates people to contribute. Re-allocating team payoffs allows her to reward contributing team members and to sanction non-cooperating members at no efficiency losses from explicit sanctioning costs. Thus, team profits are higher in the linear team allocator game but not in the best-shot case, where coordination problems lower the welfare for the remaining team members.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.