Preventive wars

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo
• 署名单位: Southern University of Science & Technology; Shandong University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.018
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 552-569
• 关键词: Power shift; COMMITMENT; bargaining; CONFLICT; COMMUNICATION

摘要

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages, the winning probability shifts towards the rising power. We find fewer preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated interaction decrease the likelihood of preventive wars. High fighting costs almost eliminate such wars when the rising power's first-stage offer is sufficiently large.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.