Honesty in the city

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dufwenberg, Martin; Feldman, Paul; Servatka, Maros; Tarraso, Jorge; Vadovic, Radovan
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Economics Bratislava; Carleton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.007
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 15-25
• 关键词: Trustworthiness; honesty; RECIPROCITY; field experiment; haggling; taxis; Mexico City

摘要

Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: the taxi market in Mexico City. We find a remarkably high degree of trustworthiness, even with price-haggling which was predicted to reduce trustworthiness.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.