Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garrett, Daniel F.
• 署名单位: University of Essex
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.007
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 161-170
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; Repeated trade; budget balance; dynamic arrivals; participation constraints

摘要

This paper studies the design of efficient mechanisms for repeated bilateral trade in settings where (i) traders' values and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and available to participate in the mechanism at random times. Under a weak condition, analogous to the non-overlapping supports condition of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), efficient trade is only feasible if the mechanism runs an expected budget deficit. The smallest such deficit is attainable by a sequence of static mechanisms.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).