On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prokopovych, Pavlo; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: Kyiv School of Economics; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.006
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 348-362
• 关键词: Contest; All -pay auction; Payoff security; Monotone equilibrium; Local intersection property

摘要

We introduce a new approach to studying the existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in an n-player single-prize contest model that covers both perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests. The contestants have continua of possible types and bids, atomless type distributions, and their valuations and costs might depend not only on their own bids and types but also on other bidders' bids and types. Many, quite different contests are covered by our generalized contest model and equilibrium existence in monotone pure strategies in them follows from this paper's results.(c) 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by-nc -nd /4 .0/).