Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco
• 署名单位: Otto Friedrich University Bamberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 30-51
• 关键词: Sequential round-robin tournament; all-pay auction; fairness; intensity; Strategic momentum; experiment

摘要

We experimentally investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.