Mechanism design with informational punishment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balzer, Benjamin; Schneider, Johannes
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.012
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 197-209
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Endogenous outside options; Default games; Full participation; signaling; Informational opportunism

摘要

We introduce informational punishment to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal informational punishment ensures that full participation is without loss, even if any single player can publicly enforce the status quo mechanism. Informational punishment permits using a standard revelation principle, is independent of the mechanism designer's objective, and operates exclusively off the equilibrium path. It is robust to refinements and applies in informed-principal settings. We provide conditions that make it robust to opportunistic signal designers.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).