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作者：Comola, Margherita; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); emlyon business school; Universite Lyon 2; Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 1; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We experimentally investigate targeting decisions in a setting where a human player competes for influence in a network against a computerized opponent with opposing views, whose targeting choice is revealed before the player acts. By varying network structure, opponent influence, and nodes opinion heterogeneity, we find that players typically adopt best-response strategies based on relative influence. However, they sometimes deviate-for example, by erroneously targeting central nodes or by av...
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作者：Compte, Olivier
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees
摘要：Building on the idea that lack of experience is a source of errors but that experience should reduce them, we model agents' behavior using a stochastic choice model (logit quantal response), leaving endogenous the accuracy of their choices. In some games, higher accuracy leads to unstable logitresponse dynamics. Starting from the lowest possible accuracy, we define the barrier to learning as the maximum accuracy which keeps the logit-response dynamic stable (for all lower accuracies). This def...
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作者：Garcia-Pola, Bernardo; Iriberri, Nagore
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Basque Country; Lund University
摘要：Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals' initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents' past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initia...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Baklanov, Artem; Victorova, Elizaveta
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：A set of kn indivisible items is to be allocated to n agents; each agent has to get exactly k items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the traditional ones based on disregarding one object. Our model and new fairness properties are insensitive to positive affine transformations of utilities, h...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Pkhakadze, Nikoloz
作者单位：Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
摘要：We introduce an equilibrium model of polarizing communication between a sender and two receivers. The sender's payoff is a function of the receivers' beliefs on a binary payoff relevant variable. All agents share a common prior about this variable. But we assume disagreement about a second binary variable, which enters no utility functions. We characterize the joint distribution of receiver posterior beliefs on the payoff relevant variable that can be implemented. An immediate consequence of t...
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作者：Bos, Olivier; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the standard revenue from the respective auction without signaling concern, and a signaling component. The latter is the bidders' ex...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Cho and Kreps (1987) proposed a series of criteria for selecting equilibria in signaling games. Their procedure for applying each criterion was to identify all implausible sender types associated with a given off-path message, then look for sequential equilibria assigning probability zero to every implausible type. This paper provides a systematic study of iterated applications of Cho and Kreps (1987) criteria-where in each round, one excludes the additional types that become implausible becau...
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作者：Choon, Thea How
作者单位：Saint Lawrence University
摘要：Do interest groups provide information in ways that systematically bias and polarize candidates? I consider a Downsian model where candidates are uncertain about the median voter's preference. Up to two interest groups, completely biased, observe voter preferences in the extremes and send costless messages to candidates. Starting with one interest group, I show all informative equilibria are asymmetric: the interest group plays favorites by revealing coarse information to one candidate, causin...
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作者：Feng, Jun; Jin, Jia; Zhao, Sasa; Derrington, Edmund; Qin, Xiangdong; Fu, Shiguang; Shen, Qiang; Dreher, Jean-Claude
作者单位：Nanjing Agricultural University; Shanghai International Studies University; South China Normal University; Universite Lyon 1; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Lyon 1; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：Repeated strategic interactions with consistent partners involve both adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning. Hybrid models that incorporate reasoning into adaptive learning paradigms have been proposed to capture these processes and their interactions at the behavioral level. Here, we employ model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural computations underlying decisions in repeated strategic interactions between two players using 11-20 money request ...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We consider a setting where each player of a simultaneous-move game privately designs an information structure before playing the game. One of these information structures is chosen at random to determine the distribution of the private messages that players receive. These messages allow players to correlate their actions; however, their private design implies a push from correlated to Nash equilibria. Indeed, the sequential equilibrium payoffs of the extensive-form game with privately designe...
