Weak* dominance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Luo, Xiao; Qiao, Yongchuan
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.004
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: LEXICOGRAPHIC PROBABILITIES; correlated equilibrium; Admissibility; BEHAVIOR; CHOICE; nash

摘要

We propose a new dominance notion in strategic games-weak* dominance-that reflects the idea of cautious* rationality, whereby a rational player believes that each opponent's individual actions are played with positive probabilities. In this paper, we show that an action is weakly* dominated if, and only if, it is not a best response to any marginally full-support conjecture. We characterize Gul's (1996) notion of perfect z-rationalizability through an iterative procedure (S infinity W*): removing all weakly* dominated actions in the first round, and then removing only strictly dominated actions in the subsequent rounds. Moreover, we provide epistemic foundations for the iterative procedure in a lexicographic type structure model.