Robust group manipulation with indifferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kivinen, Steven
• 署名单位: University of Graz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.001
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Group strategy-proofness; college admissions; mechanisms; CHOICE

摘要

We define two belief-free notions of coalitional non-manipulability that rule out coalitions in which some agents are indifferent. Strong robust group strategy-proofness typically yields negative results as it often rules out desirable rules. Semi-strong robust group strategy-proofness permits desirable rules in some environments. The differences between these properties highlight a crucial link between standard truthtelling properties: all members of a successful deviating coalition believe the outcome changes, and indifferent members believe they are essential to implement the change.