-
作者：Zeng, Yishu
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：This paper investigates how to persuade multiple interacting receivers under arbitrary equilibrium selection and when receivers' preferences may exhibit psychological traits. Our main result characterizes the conditions under which the sender can categorize information using partitions and then disclose partition-related information without altering the equilibrium outcome. This finding broadens the traditional direct approach based on the revelation principle, which categorizes messages solel...
-
作者：Bland, James R.
作者单位：University of Toledo; University System of Ohio; University of Toledo
摘要：This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) more favorable small-sample properties, and (ii) ease of handling unobservable heterogeneity. As Quantal Response Equilibrium is a non-linear model, I also discuss some issues with choosing appropriate priors. Of the twenty-nine models taken to the data, the sel...
-
作者：Walunj, Tushar Shankar; Singhal, Shiksha; Kavitha, Veeraruna; Nair, Jayakrishnan
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Bombay
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best responses, an equilibrium cycle is a set-valued solution concept that can be demonstrated even in games where best responses do not exist (for example, in discontinuous games). The equilibrium cycle identifies a Cartesian product set of action profiles that satisfies...
-
作者：Bartholdi, Laurent; Mikhailov, Roman
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut National des Sciences Appliquees de Lyon - INSA Lyon; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 1; Ecole Centrale de Lyon; University of Geneva; Saarland University; Saint Petersburg State University
摘要：We introduce a topological invariant of games, based on homotopy theory, that measures their complexity. We examine it in the context of the Texas Hold'em variant of poker, and show that the invariant's value is at least 4. We deduce that evaluating the strength of a pair of cards in Texas Hold'em is an intricate problem, and that even the notion of who is bluffing against whom is ill-defined in some situations. The use of higher topological methods to study intransitivity of multi-player game...
-
作者：Sethi, Ravideep; Verriest, Ewout
作者单位：University of Utah; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining model with a dynamically evolving status quo. Three players, one of whom is permanently endowed with veto power, must split a fixed budget in each period. Despite her additional power, the veto player cannot always asymptotically extract the full surplus. The non-veto players endogenously prevent each other's expropriation when they are patient and have high initial allocations in the unique stationary, symmetric, stageundominated, coal...
-
作者：Jalota, Devansh; Ostrovsky, Michael; Pavone, Marco
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities in which money can exchange hands between matched agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish that equilibrium arrangements are surplus-maximizing and study the conditions on the distributional constraints under which equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently when agents have linear preferences. Our main result is a linear programming duality me...
-
作者：Malcomson, James M.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Employees are divided into grades. Toyota places suppliers into only a small number of This paper shows that grouping of privately informed and persistent agent types arises in relational incentive contracts when agent type is continuous. Malcomson (2016) showed full separation is not possible if, following full revelation of an agent's type, payoffs for and agent are on the Pareto frontier. This paper shows how much separation can be Specifically, it characterizes the finest partitioning that...
-
作者：Akoz, Kemal Kivanc; Dogan, Emre; Kesten, Onur; Okulicz, Danisz
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Sydney; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stab...
-
作者：Grigis, Federico; Lozza, Sergio Ortobelli; Vitali, Sebastiano
作者单位：University of Bergamo; University of Bergamo; Charles University Prague
摘要：We propose a model of information transmission and reputation building within a social network that exploits portfolio theory and option structures. The network aims to estimate an unknown parameter through multiple communication rounds. At every communication round, estimates of different agents' abilities are shared, avoiding the repetition of information. These estimates are interpreted as financial assets driven by a compound Poisson process. After every communication round, agents constru...
-
作者：Kong, Qianqian; Peters, Hans; Sun, Hao
作者单位：Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics; Maastricht University; Northwestern Polytechnical University
摘要：The quasi-prekernel is a novel solution concept for cooperative games. It is a refinement of existing prebargaining set solutions, notably the reactive, semireactive, and Aumann-Davis-Maschler prebargaining sets. It contains the prekernel, and coincides with that solution on simple games except possibly on balanced simple games with all individual worths equal to zero. An axiomatic characterization based on reduced game properties is provided. The steady version, obtained by putting conditions...
