Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shinozaki, Hiroki
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.008
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; house allocation; preferences; EFFICIENCY; auctions; assignment; MARKET; RULE

摘要

We consider an object reallocation problem with transfers. We show that if a rule satisfies endowments-swapping-proofness, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and non-imposition, then the rule coincides with the top trading cycles rule without transfers (TTC without transfers). Thus, even when transfers among agents are allowed, no transfers occur under such a rule, not even in the form of fixed prices.