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作者：Sharma, Nishtha
作者单位：Charles University Prague
摘要：Many economic situations involve contests for resources, such as winning prizes and earning bonuses. The likelihood of success in such contests is often skewed, favoring some competitors while putting others at a disadvantage. I study the strategic interaction between an advantaged and a disadvantaged competitor in a repeated contest where winning can help overcome the initial disadvantage. Theoretically, both competitors increase their efforts, but the advantaged competitor increases effort b...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：In a recent paper, Lin and Palfrey (2024) developed a theory of cognitive hierarchies (CH) in sequential games and observed that this solution concept is not reduced-normal-form invariant. In this paper I qualify and explain this observation. I show that the CH model is normal-form invariant, and that the differences arising from the application of the CH model to the reduced normal form depend only on how randomization by level-0 types is modeled. Indeed, while the uniform behavior strategy i...
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作者：Deng, Liuchun; Sun, Yufeng
作者单位：Duke Kunshan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper introduces the concept of participatory persuasion in autocracies, where regimes use controlled communication to sustain their rule. In an overlapping-generations model of democratization, we show that the regime's survival can be prolonged when citizens communicate within small circles compared to a setting in which communication is entirely absent. Paradoxically, limited freedom of speech enhances the regime's persuasion by turning citizens into inadvertent agents of state propaga...
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作者：Kim, Jeongbin; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We compare behavior in six variations of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by 5member teams to behavior in the same games played by individuals. The experimental design is informed by a theory of team equilibrium that generates hypotheses about systematic differences between teams and individuals in these games. We also compare three different team collective choice procedures: majority rule; majority rule preceded by a poll; and majority rule preceded by chat. In all six games, we...
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作者：Diecidue, Enrico; Langer, Thomas; Nolte, Sven; Riedmiller, Sebastian; Schneider, Judith C.
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of Munster; Radboud University Nijmegen; Leibniz University Hannover
摘要：In a series of three experiments, we investigate intrinsic preferences for timing and skewness of information resolution in a compound lottery (CL) and information structure (IS) environment. In the first experiment, we rule out predeterminedness of the outcome, i.e., realization before making the decision, as a driver of different timing preferences between the environments. In the second experiment, we show that skewness preferences in a two-outcome setting differ between the two environment...
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作者：Yun, Kiyong; Chun, Youngsub
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：On the strict preference domain, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) introduce the probabilistic serial rule and show that the rule is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) introduce the extended probabilistic serial correspondence, which generalizes the probabilistic serial rule to the full preference domain. However, this correspondence is not weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In this paper, we introduce a subdomain of the full preference domain, which w...
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作者：Roy, Jaideep; Saha, Bibhas
作者单位：University of Bath; Durham University
摘要：When artificial intelligence (AI) displaces lower-skilled workers with higher intensity, electoral democracies may slow down automation in fear of unemployment and voter resentment. Using a Downsian model of elections where parties promise to limit automation and redistribute automation surplus, we show that when automation is highly productive democracies implement maximum automation, making all workers vulnerable to redundancy and distribute the entire surplus among the working population. M...
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作者：Mandel, Antoine; Nguyen, Van-Quy; Bach, Dong-Xuan
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; National Economics University - Vietnam; Universite Paris Saclay; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：We provide a strategic model of the formation of production networks that subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach. The objective of firms in our setting is to choose their supply relationships so as to maximize their profit at the general equilibrium that unfolds. We show that this objective is equivalent to the maximization by the firms of their eigenvector centrality in the production network. As is common in network formation games based on centrality, there are multiple Nash equ...
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作者：Oishi, Takayuki; Tajika, Tomoya
作者单位：Nihon University
摘要：International river basins are prone to droughts in some countries and floods in others. Water inflows from upstream neighbors benefit drought-stricken countries but harm flood-stricken countries. As a generalization of two existing river-sharing models (Ambec and Ehlers, 2008; Ambec and Sprumont, 2002), which do not capture the disutility of water inflow, we formulate the river-sharing problem with floods. We provide two characterizations of benefit-function profiles for which the downstream ...
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作者：Wolff, Ilan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper analyzes the welfare properties of the mechanism Taiwan uses to match students to high schools. I study the Taiwan mechanism under a theoretical model where students share the same ordinal rankings, and a single lottery determines schools' preferences. In this setting, all Taiwan mechanisms ex ante weakly Pareto dominate deferred acceptance for strategizing students. Additionally, in my model, there always exists a Taiwan mechanism that provides greater welfare than deferred accepta...
