-
作者：Bredereck, Robert; Chen, Jiehua; Knop, Dusan; Luo, Junjie; Niedermeier, Rolf
作者单位：TU Clausthal; Technische Universitat Wien; Czech Technical University Prague; Beijing Jiaotong University; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this principle by proposing incrementalized versions of STABLE MARRIAGE and STA-BLE ROOMMATES, asking what the computational cost is of adapting an existing stable matching after agents' preferences have changed. We additionally require that the new stable matching should not deviate too much from the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a comprehensive computational...
-
作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Koh, Youngwoo; Baik, Sosung
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders are ambiguity averse and follow the max-min expected utility model. Each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs that are close to the seller's belief, where closeness is defined by a divergence. For a given allocation rule, we show that optimal transfers belong to a specific class of transfers, termed win-lose dependent transfers, in which bidders' transfers upon winning and losing depend only on their own types but not on their oppo...
-
作者：Cartea, Alvaro; Chang, Patrick; Penalva, Jose; Waldon, Harrison
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We prove a Folk theorem when players with bounded rationality learn as they play a repeated potential game. We use a dynamic generalization of smooth fictitious play with bounded m-recall strategies to model learning with bounded rationality that is consistent with learning by algorithms. In a repeated potential game with perfect monitoring, we use this learning model to show that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile, if players have sufficient recall, are sufficiently pat...
-
作者：Atay, Ata; Nunez, Marina; Solymosi, Tamas
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：This paper analyzes the extent to which well-known results on the relationship between the bargaining set, the core, and the kernel in one-to-one assignment games generalize to many-to-one assignment markets, and by extension, many-to-many markets. Using a minimal counterexample, we show that the bargaining set does not necessarily coincide with the core and that the kernel may not be contained within the core. We would like to highlight that the failure of the coincidence between the core and...
-
作者：Meier, Martin; Perea, Andres
作者单位：Free University of Bozen-Bolzano; Maastricht University
摘要：We propose a model of reasoning in dynamic games in which a player, at each information set, holds a conditional belief about his own future choices and the opponents' future choices. These conditional beliefs are assumed to be cautious, that is, the player never completely rules out any feasible future choice by himself or the opponents. We impose the following key conditions: (a) a player always believes that he will choose rationally in the future, (b) a player always believes that his oppo...
-
作者：Galichon, A.; Jacquet, A.
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum hide-and-seek games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge b...
-
作者：Peralta, Esteban
作者单位：University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper shows that, within familiar environments with transferable utilities, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all allocations that are stable in markets with one-sided incomplete information. The result does not hold in markets without transfers.
-
作者：Gaunersdorfer, Andrea; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna
摘要：A game is unprofitable if equilibrium payoffs do not exceed the maximin payoff for each player. In an unprofitable game, Nash equilibrium play has been notoriously difficult to justify. For a class of 3x3 games we analyze whether evolutionary and learning processes lead to Nash play. We find that neither the pure Nash equilibrium nor the pure maximin strategy are stable rest points under the studied dynamics whereas the mixed Nash equilibrium and the quantal response equilibrium may be attract...
-
作者：Bao, Leo; Gangadharan, Lata; Leister, C. Matthew
作者单位：Monash University; Monash University
摘要：We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information acquired by criminals through customary practices. Under this mechanism, a suspect caught committing a criminal act can nominate a peer who has committed a similar offense, with only the more severe offender facing penalties. Theoretical analyses indicate that, under general conditions, our mechanism drives the best-response dynamic downwards compared to the commonly used regulatory practice of penalizing only the first suspec...
-
作者：Merlino, Luca P.; Tabasso, Nicole
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (misinformation) when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a false message who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher prevalence of misinformation can increase the prevalence of the truth. We uncover conditions such that this happens and discuss policy implications. Specifically, a planner aiming to maximize the prevalence of the truth should allow misinformation to circulate if: non-verified messages...
