A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yun, Kiyong; Chun, Youngsub
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.001
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Random assignment problem; EFFICIENCY

摘要

On the strict preference domain, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) introduce the probabilistic serial rule and show that the rule is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) introduce the extended probabilistic serial correspondence, which generalizes the probabilistic serial rule to the full preference domain. However, this correspondence is not weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In this paper, we introduce a subdomain of the full preference domain, which we call the sequentially ranked from the top domain, on which the correspondence is weakly stochastic dominance strategy-proof. In fact, it is a maximal domain on which the three requirements of stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance envyfreeness, and weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are compatible. In addition, on this domain, we provide an axiomatic characterization of it by adapting its characterization on the full preference domain (Heo and Y & imath;lmaz, 2015).