The persistence of disadvantages: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sharma, Nishtha
• 署名单位: Charles University Prague
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.005
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: All-pay auctions; asymmetric contests; DISCRIMINATION; favoritism; GENDER; women; promotion; DYNAMICS; aversion; men

摘要

Many economic situations involve contests for resources, such as winning prizes and earning bonuses. The likelihood of success in such contests is often skewed, favoring some competitors while putting others at a disadvantage. I study the strategic interaction between an advantaged and a disadvantaged competitor in a repeated contest where winning can help overcome the initial disadvantage. Theoretically, both competitors increase their efforts, but the advantaged competitor increases effort by more than the disadvantaged competitor. As a result, the disadvantaged competitor becomes even less likely to win when overcoming their disadvantage is possible, implying that the initial disadvantage is persistent. Evidence from a laboratory experiment supports these theoretical predictions.