Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chatterjee, K; Lee, CC
署名单位：
Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Chinese University of Hong Kong
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0586
发表日期：
1998
页码：
203-237
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are essentially two equilibrium regimes. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately; otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is worse off, and the game results in search for a smaller set of values of the search cost, i.e., less equilibrium delay. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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